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QUESTION MEANING =
RESOLUTION CONDITIONS
Abstract. Traditional approaches to the semantics of questions analyze
questions indirectly, via the notion of an answer. In recent work on inquisi-
tive semantics, a different perspective is taken: the meaning of a question is
equated with its resolution conditions, just like the meaning of a statement
is traditionally equated with its truth-conditions. In this paper I argue that
this proposal improves on previous approaches, combining the formal ele-
gance and explanatory power of Groenendijk and Stokhof’s partition theory
with the greater generality afforded by answer-set theories.
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1. Introduction
Classically, the meaning of a statement is equated with its truth condi-
tions: one knows what a statement means if one knows what a state of
aﬀairs has to be like for the statement to be true. This simple but pow-
erful notion of meaning plays a fundamental role in disciplines connected
to language and meaning, including logic, linguistics, philosophy of lan-
guage, computer science, and cognitive science. From a linguistic point
of view, truth-conditions allow us to give a perspicuous characterization
of the information that a speaker conveys in uttering a sentence, namely,
the information that the actual state of aﬀairs is one in which the sen-
tence is true. From a logical point of view, they allow us to characterize
fundamental logical notions like entailment and consistency.
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In the standard intensional semantics framework, complete states of
aﬀairs are modeled as entities called possible worlds, or simply worlds.
Truth can then be modeled formally as a relation holding between worlds
and statements. This allows us to package the meaning of a statement
into a single semantic object, namely, the set consisting of all those
worlds where the statement is true. This set of worlds is referred to as
the proposition expressed by the statement.1
This classical view on meaning, however, is not applicable when it
comes to analyzing sentences which are questions, rather than state-
ments.2 Like statements, questions play a fundamental role in a number
of ﬁelds: linguistically, they make information exchange possible, allow-
ing speakers to raise issues and to steer the conversation towards certain
goals. Cognitively, questions drive the process of inquiry [Friedman,
2013], allowing us to pursue and achieve knowledge; additionally, they
have been argued to play a key role in human reasoning [Koralus and
Mascarenhas, 2014]. The role of questions in logic is perhaps less evi-
dent, but not less crucial [see Wiśniewski, 2013; Ciardelli, 2016b,a, for
discussion]. It thus seems of great importance to have a general, simple,
and clear notion of the meaning of a question  one that can play the
same fundamental role as the notion of truth-conditional content plays
for statements. However, no consensus on such a notion has thus far
emerged: a number of inﬂuential theories have been proposed, but none
has acquired a status which is comparable to that of the truth-conditional
approach to statements.
In diﬀerent ways, traditional theories of questions have approached
the problem of giving a semantics to questions by reducing a question to
its possible answers: answers are statements, so they can be associated
with propositions, and this gives us an indirect handle on the semantics
1 For the sake of simplicity, I am abstracting away here from an important feature
of the semantics of statements in natural languages, namely, context-sensitivity. In
general, it is only relative to a specific context that a statement, for instance “You
were in London yesterday”, can be assigned truth-conditions [Stalnaker, 1978]. Thus,
when considering statements in natural language, we should really talk about the
proposition expressed in a given context. Since the points I will make here are not
specific to the analysis of natural language (but also concern questions in formal
languages), and since they are unaffected by context-sensitivity, in this paper I will
omit reference to the context.
2 For detailed arguments against the view that the semantics of questions can
be analyzed in terms of truth-conditions [see, e.g., Belnap, 1990; Groenendijk and
Stokhof, 1997].
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of the question. In this paper, we will focus in particular on two families
of traditional theories of the semantics of questions.3
1. Answer-set theories [Hamblin, 1973; Karttunen, 1977; Bennett, 1979;
Belnap, 1982] are based on the following tenets:
• the meaning of a question µ is a set BSA(µ) of propositions;
• p ∈ BSA(µ) holds iﬀ p counts as a basic semantic answer to µ.4
2. Partition theories [Higginbotham and May, 1981; Groenendijk and
Stokhof, 1984] are based on the following tenets:5
• the meaning of a question µ is an equivalence relation ≡µ on the
space of possible worlds;
• w ≡µ w′ holds iﬀ the true complete answer to µ is the same in w
and w′.
Recently, a diﬀerent approach has been taken in the framework of in-
quisitive semantics [Ciardelli, Groenendijk, and Roelofsen, 2013]. This
approach does not pursue a reduction of questions to answers; rather,
it is closer to the standard semantics for statements in terms of truth-
conditions. The meaning of a question is taken to lie in its resolution
conditions: one knows what a sentence means if one knows what infor-
mation needs to be available for the question to be resolved. This notion
of question meaning is very similar to the standard notion of meaning
for statements: in both cases, the semantics takes the form of a relation
that holds when a certain semantic object “satisﬁes” a sentence. Only,
in the case of a question, the relevant object is not a state of aﬀairs, but
3 A third important family consists of the so-called categorial theories (also known
as functional theories) [Tichy, 1978; Hausser and Zaefferer, 1978; Scha, 1983]. These
theories differ radically from the ones that we will discuss, in that they do not assume
that all questions express the same type of semantic object. We will come back to
these theories briefly in Section 7.4.
4 This is a simplification: more precisely, in these theories it is the extension of a
question at a possible world which is a set of proposition. The meaning of a question
can be identified with its intension, which is a function mapping each world to the
corresponding extension. In addition, in the theories of [Bennett, 1979; Belnap, 1982],
the extension of a question is a set of so-called open propositions, i.e., functions from
sequences of individuals to propositions. These complications, while important to the
concrete workings of these theories, are immaterial to the features that we shall be
concerned with in this paper.
5 A similar treatment was proposed by Lewis [1988] for subject matters, which
can be seen as questions under a particular role.
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rather a state of information, and the notion of satisfaction is not cashed
out in terms of truth, but in terms of resolution.6,7
In the standard intensional semantic framework, information states
can be modeled as sets of worlds, following a tradition that goes back at
least to Hintikka [1962], and which is commonly used in the analysis of
language since Stalnaker [1978]: more speciﬁcally, an information state
can be identiﬁed with the set of worlds which are compatible with the
given information. This allows us to package up the resolution conditions
of a question into a single semantic object, namely, the set consisting
of those information states where the question is resolved. Thus, the
inquisitive semantics approach to questions can be described as based
on the following tenets:
• the meaning of a question µ is a set Res(µ) of information states;
• s ∈ Res(µ) holds iﬀ µ is resolved in the information state s.8
The goal of this paper is to make a case for the notion of question mean-
ing adopted in inquisitive semantics, illustrating how it improves both
on the answer-set tradition and on the partition tradition. In doing so, I
bring together a number of arguments from the traditional literature on
questions [notably from Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984; Belnap, 1982]
with arguments given in recent work on inquisitive semantics [especially
6 This perspective is characteristic of “modern” systems of inquisitive semantics,
starting with [Ciardelli, 2009]. Previous systems of inquisitive semantics [Groenendijk,
2009; Mascarenhas, 2009] were closer to the partition theory in this respect: they took
questions to express binary relations on the logical space, as in the partition theory,
but without the requirement that the relevant relations be equivalence relations. This
approach will be discussed in Section 7.2.
7 In fact, inquisitive semantics brings statements and questions even closer to-
gether by letting both kinds of sentences be interpreted in terms of satisfaction at an
information state  referred to as support. A question is supported if the information
available in the given state resolves the question, while a statement is supported
if the available information establishes that the statement is true. The possibility
of such a uniform interpretation is a key asset of the inquisitive view on question
meaning. Nevertheless, we will set aside this important aspect in this paper, and
focus exclusively on the semantic analysis of questions.
8 Notice that, formally, information states are the same thing as propositions,
namely, they are sets of possible worlds. However, when we look upon a set of worlds
as an information state, we think of it as encoding an arbitrary body of information,
rather than a single content capable of being expressed by a sentence or grasped as
a unit. Thus, our perspective is somewhat different in the two cases. Nevertheless,
in order to facilitate the comparison between inquisitive semantics and previous ap-
proaches based on propositions, below we will usually blur the distinction, and we
will often refer to the elements of Res(µ) as propositions.
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from Ciardelli, 2009; Groenendijk, 2011; Roelofsen, 2013; Ciardelli et al.,
2013, 2016]. The case relies on some theoretical desiderata for a theory
of questions that were ﬁrst identiﬁed by Groenendijk and Stokhof [1984].
As Groenendijk and Stokhof already observed, answer-set theories fail
to meet these desiderata. Groenendijk and Stokhof’s partition theory
does meet the desiderata but, as we will see, it does so at the cost
of a reduced generality. We will see that, by contrast, the approach
taken in inquisitive semantics meets Groenendijk and Stokhof’s desider-
ata without being restricted in a similar way. Thus, inquisitive semantics
combines the conceptual and formal advantages of the partition theory
with the broader empirical scope aﬀorded by answer-set theories.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce two de-
siderata for a theory of questions, drawn from [Groenendijk and Stokhof,
1984]. In Section 3 we discuss answer-set theories, and we show that
these desiderata are not met on these approaches. In Section 4 we discuss
the partition theory and show that, while it meets the desiderata, it also
makes the strong assumption that questions have a unique true complete
answer at each world. In Section 5 we discuss three important classes of
questions which do not satisfy this assumption. In Section 6 we show that
inquisitive semantics meets Groenendijk and Stokhof’s desiderata with-
out being restricted to unique-answer questions. In Section 7 we consider
how answer-set theories and partition theories might try to overcome
their respective problems, we clarify a potential misconception about
the inquisitive approach, and we point out some empirical limitations
that all these theories share. Finally, Section 8 sums up and concludes.
2. Two theoretical desiderata
At the outset of their celebrated PhD thesis, Groenendijk and Stokhof
[1984] (henceforth, G&S) identiﬁed a number of desiderata that a theory
of questions should satisfy. Two of these desiderata are especially inter-
esting in that, while arising from general conceptual considerations, they
provide strong, concrete guidelines for building a theory of questions.
The desiderata stem from the idea that a theory should not just have
descriptive value, but also explanatory value. What this means is that
the theory should not just account for the phenomena which occur in
the relevant domain, but should do so on the basis of assumptions which
are as minimal, general, and independently motivated as possible. In
388 Ivano Ciardelli
particular, general phenomena should receive a uniform account across
the various domains in which they occur.
It seems natural to require of a semantic theory that deals with a certain
domain of phenomena, that it account for such phenomena as they occur
elsewhere too, by using general principles, notions and operations which
can be applied outside the particular domain of the theory as well.
G&S [1984, p. 11]
Concretely, G&S take this desideratum to apply to two speciﬁc notions.
The ﬁrst is the fundamental semantic relation of entailment.
An example of a relation which can be found in every descriptive do-
main is the relation of entailment. Whatever concrete phenomena some
particular analysis deals with, the relation of entailment will be one of
the most fundamental relations that the analysis will have to account
for. Descriptive adequacy requires only that the analysis give a correct
account of whatever entailments hold in its descriptive domain. But
explanatory adequacy is achieved if this account is based on a general
notion of entailment, one that applies in other domains equally well. In
fact, the semantic framework one uses brings along a general deﬁnition
of entailment. For example, if the framework is based on set-theory,
entailment will basically be inclusion. Hence, whenever some analysis
in this framework is to account for the fact that one expression entails
another, it should do so by assigning them meanings in such a way that
the meaning of the one is included in the meaning of the other.
G&S [1984, p. 11]
Given that their proposal, like most model-theoretic semantics, is indeed
formulated within the set-theoretic framework of intensional type-theory,
G&S aim at a theory that assigns to each question µ a meaning [[µ]]
in accordance with the following desideratum: a question µ entails a
question ν, denoted µ |= ν, if and only if [[µ]] ⊆ [[ν]].
Desideratum 1. For any questions µ and ν: µ |= ν ⇐⇒ [[µ]] ⊆ [[ν]]
Now, how exactly should we think of entailment among questions? G&S
characterize this relation as follows: a question µ entails a question ν
if every proposition giving an answer to µ also gives an answer to ν.
In this paper, we will talk of resolving a question rather than giving an
answer, since we will want to avoid relying on an underlying notion of
an answer; however, we will construe this relation in the same way as
G&S did: a proposition p resolves µ just in case µ is resolved whenever
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the information provided by p is available. Letting Res(µ) denote the set
of propositions/information states that resolve a question µ, the notion
of question entailment can thus be characterized as follows.
(1) µ |= ν ⇐⇒ ∀p : p ∈ Res(µ) implies p ∈ Res(ν)
⇐⇒ Res(µ) ⊆ Res(ν)
For an illustration of how Desideratum 1 constrains a semantics of ques-
tions, consider the sentences below: clearly, (2-a) entails (2-b): when-
ever we establish what Alice’s phone number is, we also automatically
establish whether or not her number ends with a 6. Thus, meeting
Desideratum 1 requires assigning meanings to these sentences in such a
way that [[(2-a)]] ⊆ [[(2-b)]].
(2) a. What is Alice’s phone number?
b. Does Alice’s phone number end with a 6?
Besides entailment, the other general phenomenon that G&S consider is
coordination by means of conjunction and disjunction. G&S write:
Coordination, too, is to be found in all kinds of categories. Hence, the
explanatory power of an analysis that deals with coordinations of ex-
pressions of some particular category is greatly enhanced if the account
it gives is based on general semantic operations associated with the
coordination processes. Again, the semantic framework deﬁnes these
operations. If the framework is based on set theory, conjunction and dis-
junction of expressions in whatever category will have to be interpreted
as intersection and union, respectively. G&S [1984, pp. 11–12]
Thus, G&S aim at a theory that interprets coordinated questions in
accordance with the following desideratum, where conjunction and dis-
junction are denoted respectively by ∧ and ∨.
Desideratum 2. For any questions µ and ν:
• [[µ ∧ ν]] = [[µ]] ∩ [[ν]]
• [[µ ∨ ν]] = [[µ]] ∪ [[ν]]
In order to meet this desideratum, we need a notion of question meaning
according to which we have, e.g., [[(3-a)]] = [[(3-c)]]∩[[(3-d)]] and [[(3-b)]] =
[[(3-c)]] ∪ [[(3-d)]].9
9 Some authors [notably Szabolcsi, 1997, 2015; Krifka, 2001] have claimed that
questions cannot be truly disjoined, and that the only reading available for a question
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(3) a. What is Alice’s phone number, and what is her email address?
b. What is Alice’s phone number, or what is her email address?
c. What is Alice’s phone number?
d. What is Alice’s email address?
Let me conclude this section by addressing one reasonable concern about
G&S’s desiderata: one might object to G&S’s argument by rejecting
the idea that using a semantic framework based on set-theory requires
that entailment, conjunction, and disjunction be analyzed in terms of
inclusion, intersection, and union. While this is a fair objection, the fact
remains that an explanatory theory should be based on a general analysis
of these notions. Thus, if one wishes to defend a theory of questions
which requires us to depart from the standard notions provided by the
type theoretic framework, the burden is on them to show that their non-
standard analysis can be derived from a general analysis of entailment
and coordination which applies cross-categorically. As long as no such
alternative is proposed and shown to be viable, G&S’s desiderata retain
their appeal.
3. Answer-set theories
Desiderata 1 and 2 are central to the argument that G&S make against
the answer-set approach to questions. As discussed above, in answer-
set theories, the meaning of a question µ is taken to be a set BSA(µ)
of propositions, and the propositions in this set are construed as basic
semantic answers to the question, where the notion of a basic semantic
answer is not further characterized in terms of more primitive notions.
Answer-set theories do not satisfy G&S’s desiderata. To see this,
consider again the questions (2-a) and (2-b), repeated below as (4-a)
and (4-b), which exemplify the relation of entailment.
(4) a. What is Alice’s phone number?
b. Does Alice’s phone number end with a 6?
like (3-b) is one where or is interpreted as a correction, so that a speaker uttering (3-b)
is simply asking what Alice’s email address is. Here I assume, with Groenendijk and
Stokhof [1984, 1989], that (3-b) admits a non-corrective reading, where the question
asks the addressee to specify either Alice’s phone number, or her email address. For
a more natural example, consider [for a detailed discussion see Ciardelli et al., 2015a]:
(i) Where can we rent a car, or who has one hat we could borrow?
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For x a sequence of digits, let px be the proposition that Alice’s phone
number is x: px = {w | Alice’s phone number in w is x}. Also, let q6 be
the proposition that Alice’s phone number ends with a 6, and let q6 be
the proposition that her phone number does not end with a 6. Setting
aside details which are immaterial for our purposes, the interpretation
of these questions in answer-set theories is as follows:
(5) a. BSA(4-a) = {px | x a sequence of digits}
b. BSA(4-b) = {q6, q6}
Clearly, BSA(4-a) 6⊆ BSA(4-b). This shows that Desideratum 1 is not
satisﬁed: on proposition-set theories, question entailment is not ac-
counted for by the general type-theoretic notion of entailment as meaning
inclusion.
Desideratum 2 is not satisﬁed either. To see this, consider again
(3-a), repeated below as (6-a):
(6) a. What is Alice’s phone number, and what is her email address?
b. What is Alice’s phone number?
c. What is Alice’s email address?
Proposition-set theories assign the following sets of basic semantic an-
swers to (6-a) and (6-b), where rx denotes the proposition that Alice’s
email address is a certain sequence of characters x.
(7) a. BSA(6-b) = {px | x a sequence of digits}
b. BSA(6-c) = {rx | x a sequence of characters}
Under unproblematic assumptions on the space of possible worlds, no
single proposition can be both of the form px and of the form ry. Thus,
the sets BSA(6-b) and BSA(6-c) are disjoint. If we were to interpret the
conjunctive question (6-a) in accordance with Desideratum 2, we would
get BSA(6-a) = BSA(6-b) ∩ BSA(6-c) = ∅. Clearly, this is not the result
that we expect for a perfectly consistent question like (6-a). This shows
that Desideratum 2 fails as well: on the basis of answer-set theories, the
general type-theoretic treatment of conjunction in terms of intersection
cannot be used to analyze conjunctive questions.
Thus, we conclude that answer-set theories fail to provide an ac-
count of question entailment and coordination based on the general type-
theoretic notions of entailment and coordination. Absent an alternative
general account of these phenomena, answer-set theories are thus unsatis-
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factory in terms of explanatory adequacy. In Section 7.1, we will set aside
G&S’s requirements and ask whether a satisfactory characterization of
question entailment and coordination based on answer-set theories 
even an ad-hoc one  is at all possible. We will see that such a char-
acterization, while possible under certain assumptions, brings out some
problems with the notion of meaning adopted in these theories [for dis-
cussion of these problems, see also Roelofsen, 2013; Ciardelli et al., 2016].
Since entailment and coordination are such fundamental notions  rel-
evant not only to linguistics, but also to logic and cognition  I regard
the diﬃculty in analyzing these notions as a serious shortcoming of the
answer-set approach as a general foundation for the analysis of questions.
4. Partition theory
G&S take the observations made in the previous section to “clearly in-
dicate that the [answer-set] framework simply assigns the wrong type
of semantic object to interrogatives”. They then go on to develop their
own, rather diﬀerent theory of questions. In this theory, the meaning of
a question µ is not a set of propositions, but an equivalence relation ≡µ
on the space of possible worlds. Given two worlds w and w′, the relation
w ≡µ w′ holds if and only if the true complete answer to the question
is the same in w and w′. The relation ≡µ induces a corresponding par-
tition Πµ of the logical space, with the elements of the partition being
the equivalence classes of worlds modulo ≡µ: these equivalence classes
are then viewed as the possible complete answers to the question µ. A
proposition p resolves the question µ if it entails one of these complete
answers. So, given a question µ we have:
(8) p ∈ Res(µ) ⇐⇒ p ⊆ a for some a ∈ Πµ
⇐⇒ ∀w,w′ ∈ p : w ≡µ w
′
Using this connection between the G&S meaning of a question and its
resolution conditions, one can easily verify that in G&S’s theory, question
entailment is indeed captured as meaning inclusion, i.e., Desideratum 1
is met.10
10 Recall that a binary relation is identical with the set of all pairs which are
related by it. Thus, to say that the inclusion ≡µ ⊆ ≡ν holds is just to say for any
two worlds w and w′, if w ≡µ w
′ then w ≡ν w
′. In terms of the associated partitions,
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(9) µ |= ν ⇐⇒ ≡µ ⊆ ≡ν
For instance, consider again the pair consisting of the questions µ = (2-a)
and ν = (2-b). If w ≡µ w′, then the answer to µ must be the same in w
as in w′, i.e., Alice must have the same phone number in the two worlds.
But then, w and w′ must also agree on whether the last digit of Alice’s
number is 6. So, the answer to ν must be the same in the two worlds as
well, which means that w ≡ν w′. This shows that the inclusion ≡µ ⊆ ≡ν
holds, as it should according to Desideratum 1.
Now consider the questions µ = (3-c) and ν = (3-d), and the corre-
sponding conjunctive question µ ∧ ν = (3-a). For the complete answer
to µ ∧ ν to be the same in w and w′, it is necessary and suﬃcient that
both the answer to µ and the answer to ν be the same. Thus, we have:
(10) w ≡µ∧ν w′ ⇐⇒ w ≡µ w′ and w ≡ν w′
This shows that the relation ≡µ∧ν associated with the conjunction coin-
cides with the intersection ≡µ ∩ ≡ν of the relations associated with the
conjuncts. Thus, Desideratum 2 is satisﬁed. It is easy to see that this
holds not just for (3-a), but for conjunctive questions in general.11
A problem arises when we consider disjunctive questions such as
(3-b). Desideratum 2 implies that the meaning of a disjunctive question
should be obtained by taking the union of the meanings of the disjuncts.
However, the union ≡µ ∪ ≡ν of two equivalence relations, unlike their
intersection, is not in general an equivalence relation, and therefore it
is not the kind of object that can serve as the meaning of a question
in G&S’s theory. Thus, Desideratum 2 is bound to fail for disjunction.
In fact, as we will discuss in a moment, a disjunction like (3-b) simply
cannot be assigned a suitable meaning in G&S’s theory.
Setting aside disjunctions of questions for the moment, G&S’s ap-
proach provides us with a theory of questions which is well-behaved and
explanatory. In particular, question entailment and conjunction can be
analyzed simply by applying to questions the general notions of entail-
ment and conjunction made available by the framework of type theory.
≡µ ⊆ ≡ν means that the partition Πµ is a refinement of the partition Πν , i.e., every
block of Πν is a union of blocks from Πµ.
11 A general argument can be given starting from the assumption that to resolve
a conjunctive question is to resolve both conjuncts, using the fact that w ≡µ w
′ ⇐⇒
{w,w′} ∈ Res(µ), which is a special case of the relation in (8).
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Furthermore, this result is obtained by working with objects that are
formally simpler than the ones used in answer-set theories.12
However, the simplicity of G&S’s semantic objects comes at a price:
namely, G&S’s theory is built on the assumption that the question µ
under consideration has a unique true complete answer at each world.
This assumption is presupposed when deﬁning ≡µ as the relation that
holds between two worlds when the true complete answer to µ in these
worlds is the same, and it is reﬂected formally by the fact that the set
of complete answers forms a partition of the logical space; this means
that at each world, exactly one complete answer to the question is true.
However, in the next section we will see that for several important classes
of questions, this assumption fails. This point was forcefully made by
Belnap [1982], who referred to the assumption underlying the partition
theory as the unique-answer fallacy.
5. Non-partition questions
Let us say that a question µ is analyzable in the partition theory if there
exists some equivalence relation ≡µ such that the resolution conditions
for µ are given by ≡µ according to relation (8). In order to understand
exactly which questions can be analyzed in partition semantics, let us
look more closely at the notion of a complete answer. In terms of resolu-
tion conditions, we can characterize the complete answer to a question µ
at a world w as a proposition aw such that establishing aw is necessary
and suﬃcient in order to truthfully resolve µ at w.
(11) Complete answer to a question at a world: a proposition aw is
the complete answer to µ at w if (i) aw is true at w and (ii) for
all propositions p true at w: p ∈ Res(µ) ⇐⇒ p ⊆ aw.
It is easy to see that if the complete answer to µ at w exists, then it
is uniquely determined. We will say that a question µ is a partition
question if at every world w there exists a proposition aw which is the
complete answer to µ at w. We can show that the questions which are
analyzable in the partition theory are exactly the partition questions.
12 For G&S, the extension of a question at a world is a single proposition
the true complete answer to the question  rather than a set of propositions, as in
answer-set theories.
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Theorem 1. A question is analyzable in the partition theory if and only
if it is a partition question.
Proof. Suppose µ is analyzable in the partition theory. This means
that there is an equivalence relation ≡µ such that p ∈ Res(µ) ⇐⇒
∀w,w′ : w ≡µ w
′. Let [w] denote the equivalence class of world w, that
is, [w] = {w′ ∈ W | w ≡µ w′}. It is easy to verify that for each w ∈ W ,
its equivalence class [w] is the complete answer to µ at w.
Conversely, suppose µ is a partition question, i.e., suppose that for
every w there is a proposition aw which is the complete answer to w. Let
≡µ be the relation deﬁned by setting w ≡µ w′ ⇐⇒ w′ ∈ aw. We need to
show two things: (i) ≡µ is an equivalence relation and (ii) the resolution
conditions of µ are induced by ≡µ in accordance with relation (8).
≡µ is reﬂexive. By deﬁnition of complete answer, aw is true at w,
i.e., w ∈ aw. Thus, w ≡µ w.
≡µ is symmetric. Suppose w ≡µ w
′. This means that w′ ∈ aw. Since
also w ∈ aw, we have {w,w′} ⊆ aw, which by deﬁnition of complete
answer implies {w,w′} ∈ Res(µ). Since {w,w′} is true at w′, again
by deﬁnition of complete answer we have {w,w′} ⊆ aw′ , which implies
w ∈ aw′ . By deﬁnition, this means that w′ ≡µ w.
≡µ is transitive. Suppose w ≡µ w′ and w′ ≡µ w′′. By deﬁnition,
w′ ≡µ w′′ means that w′′ ∈ aw′ . By symmetry, from w ≡µ w′ we obtain
w′ ≡µ w, which means that w ∈ aw′ . Since we also know that w
′ ∈ aw′ ,
we have {w,w′, w′′} ⊆ aw′ . By deﬁnition of complete answer this implies
{w,w′, w′′} ∈ Res(µ). Since {w,w′, w′′} is true at w, again by deﬁnition
of complete answer we have {w,w′, w′′} ⊆ aw. In particular, w
′′ ∈ aw,
which by deﬁnition means w ≡µ w′′.
Suppose p ∈ Res(µ) and take two elements w,w′ ∈ p. By deﬁnition
of complete answer, since p is true at w we must have p ⊆ aw. So, we
have w′ ∈ aw, which means w ≡µ w
′. So, ∀w,w′ ∈ p : w ≡µ w
′.
Conversely, suppose ∀w,w′ ∈ p : w ≡µ w′. If p = ∅, i.e., if p is the
inconsistent proposition, then µ is trivially resolved in p. Otherwise, ﬁx
w ∈ p: for any w′ ∈ p we have w ≡µ w′, which means w′ ∈ aw. Thus,
p ⊆ aw. Since p is true at w, by deﬁnition of complete answer it follows
that p ∈ Res(µ), as we wanted.
We will now discuss some important classes of questions which are
not partition questions, and which, by what we have just seen, cannot
be analyzed in the partition theory.
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First, it may not be possible to truthfully resolve a question at a
world. For instance, consider again our question (2-a), repeated below
as (12). As soon as our logical space includes worlds where Alice does
not have a phone number (say, because she has no phone) the question
cannot have a complete answer at these worlds.
(12) What is Alice’s phone number?
In other words, the partition theory in its simplest form cannot deal
with questions whose presuppositions are not satisﬁed at some possible
worlds in the logical space. However, this shortcoming can be ﬁxed quite
straightforwardly: it suﬃces to restrict the relation ≡µ to those worlds
where the question can be truthfully resolved  i.e., to those worlds
where the question’s presuppositions are satisﬁed. The relation ≡µ will
then be an equivalence relation deﬁned over a subset of the logical space.
However, the partition theory cannot be patched up in a similar way
to deal with questions that allow for various minimal resolving propo-
sitions that are all true at some world. The most important class of
questions with this feature consists of so-called mention-some questions,
such as the following ones.
(13) a. What is a common Russian name?
b. Where can I buy an Italian newspaper?
c. How can I get to the station from here?
d. What is an example of a continuous function?
In order to resolve (13-a) it is necessary and suﬃcient to establish of
some x that x is a common Russian name. Clearly, at a world  say the
actual world  there is no unique true proposition that resolves (13-a) in
a minimal way. For instance, the propositions expressed by the following
sentences are both true at the actual world, and both resolve (13-a) in
a minimal way.
(14) a. Sergey is a common Russian name.
b. Anastasia is a common Russian name.
This means that at the actual world, there is no single proposition that
counts as the complete answer to (13-a). This means that (13-a) is not
a partition question, and therefore cannot be analyzed in the partition
theory. Since mention-some questions are a broad and practically im-
portant class of questions, this is a heavy restriction that the partition
approach faces.
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Another class of non unique-answer questions consists of what we
might call approximate value questions, which play a key role in empirical
sciences. Consider the following toy example from [Yablo, 2014].
(15) How many stars are there in the Milky Way, give or take ten?
In order to resolve (15), it is necessary and suﬃcient to establish of some
number n that the number of stars lies within the range [n− 10, n+10].
Now let n0 be the actual number of stars in the Milky Way: then the
propositions expressed by the following sentences are both true at the
actual world, and both resolve (15) in a minimal way, showing that (15)
cannot be captured in the partition theory.
(16) a. There are n0 stars in the Milky way, give or take 10.
b. There are n0 + 1 stars in the Milky way, give or take 10.
Finally, a third class of non-unique answer questions consists of choice
questions. An example of choice questions is given by the disjunctive
question (3-b), repeated below as (17-a).
(17) a. What is Alice’s phone number, or what is her email address?
b. What is Alice’s phone number?
c. What is Alice’s email address?
In order to resolve (17-a), it is necessary and suﬃcient to resolve either
of the disjuncts, that is, to provide either Alice’s phone number, or her
email address. This means that in a world where the following sentences
are both true, the corresponding propositions each resolve (17-a) in a
minimal way, showing that (17-a) is not a partition question.
(18) a. Alice’s phone number is 067854890.
b. Alice’s email address is alice@email.com.
In general, disjoining two questions yields a question that can be resolved
by choosing one disjunct and resolving that disjunct whence the term
choice questions. Similarly, choice questions can also be formed by means
of indeﬁnites. Belnap [1982] discusses examples such as the following.
(19) What are two of your friends called?
To resolve this question under the reading that Belnap is interested in,
it is necessary and suﬃcient to provide the names of two friends. Again,
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it is easy to see that this is not a unique-answer question, since diﬀer-
ent choices of friends lead to diﬀerent ways to truthfully and minimally
resolve (19).
Summing up, then, while the partition theory achieves an attractive
and explanatory analysis of the workings of questions, it does so at the
cost of signiﬁcant restrictions to its empirical scope: important classes
of questions, including mention-some questions, approximate value ques-
tions, and choice questions, cannot be analyzed in this approach.
6. Inquisitive semantics
As discussed brieﬂy in the introduction, inquisitive semantics departs
from the traditional accounts of questions that are centered around the
notion of an answer. Instead, the meaning of a question is identiﬁed with
its resolution conditions: one knows what a question means if one knows
what information needs to be available for the question to be resolved.
As we discussed, in the standard framework for intensional semantics,
this means that we can identify the meaning [[µ]] of a question with the
set Res(µ) of information states in which the question is resolved. Let
us now see how this approach fares with respect to the two criteria we
have discussed so far, namely, explanatory adequacy and generality.
Let us start with the former. Desideratum 1 requires that entailment
among questions be accounted for as meaning inclusion. Now, question
entailment was characterized as the relation µ |= ν that holds when
resolving µ implies resolving ν; as spelled out in (1) above, this amounts
precisely to Res(µ) ⊆ Res(ν). This means that Desideratum 1 is satisﬁed
tautologically in inquisitive semantics: our understanding of entailment
in terms of “inquisitive strength” transparently amounts to a character-
ization in terms of inclusion of inquisitive meanings. It is important to
notice that, to obtain this result, we have not deﬁned our own, ad-hoc
notion of question entailment, which contrasts with alternative notions
considered in the literature. Rather, we have worked with the same
notion of entailment that has been assumed at least since G&S’s work,
and which stems from what seems to be the natural way to compare
questions in terms of strength.
Now let us turn to Desideratum 2. Consider again our examples of
coordinated questions, repeated below as (20-a) and (20-b).
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(20) a. What is Alice’s phone number, and what is her email address?
b. What is Alice’s phone number, or what is her email address?
c. What is Alice’s phone number?
d. What is Alice’s email address?
Clearly, to resolve the conjunctive question (20-a) is to resolve both
(20-c) and (20-d); similarly, to resolve the disjunctive question (20-b) is
to resolve either (20-c) or (20-d). In fact, the resolution conditions of
arbitrary conjunctive and disjunctive questions follows the same pattern,
that is, we have:
(21) a. s resolves µ ∧ ν ⇐⇒ s resolves both µ and ν
b. s resolves µ ∨ ν ⇐⇒ s resolves either µ or ν
But this simply means that for any two questions µ and ν we have:
(22) a. Res(µ ∧ ν) = Res(µ) ∩ Res(ν)
b. Res(µ ∨ ν) = Res(µ) ∪ Res(ν)
This means that, if we equate the meaning of a sentence with its resolu-
tion conditions, Desideratum 2 is satisﬁed as well.
Summing up, then, the inquisitive approach fully meets G&S’s theo-
retical desiderata: on the basis of this approach, the notions of question
entailment, conjunction and disjunction can be analyzed in terms of the
general notions of entailment, conjunction and disjunction provided by
type theory. Thus, equating question meaning with resolution conditions
yields a theory which provides a perspicuous and explanatory account
of these fundamental notions.
As we have discussed in the previous section, the partition approach
allows for a similar result, but only under the crucial assumption that
questions have a unique complete answer at each world  an assumption
which, we saw, limits the scope of the theory. By contrast, the inquisitive
approach requires no such assumption: both partition questions and
non-partition questions can be interpreted straightforwardly in terms of
resolution conditions. For partition questions, the inquisitive treatment
is essentially isomorphic to the one given by the partition theory. More
explicitly, given any partition question µ, the equivalence relation ≡µ
and the set Res(µ) of resolving states are inter-derivable, by means of
the following connections:
(23) a. s ∈ Res(µ) ⇐⇒ ∀w,w′ ∈ s : w ≡µ w′
b. w ≡µ w′ ⇐⇒ {w,w′} ∈ Res(µ)
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For example, in inquisitive semantics, our questions (2-a) and (2-b) are
analyzed as follows.
(24) a. What is Alice’s phone number?
b. Res((24-a)) = {s | s ⊆ px for some x},
where px = {w | Alice’s phone number in w is x}
(25) a. Does Alice’s phone number end with a 6?
b. Res((2-b)) = {s | s ⊆ p6 or s ⊆ p6},
where p6 = {w | Alice’s phone number in w ends with a 6},
p6 = {w | Alice’s phone number in w does not end with a 6}
At the same time, all the non-partition questions considered in the pre-
vious section, which were out of the scope of the partition theory, can
be analyzed quite straightforwardly in inquisitive semantics.
(26) a. What is a common Russian name?
b. Res((26-a)) = {s | s ⊆ px for some x},
where px = {w | x is a common Russian name in w}
(27) a. How many stars are there in the Milky Way, give or take 10?
b. Res((27-a)) = {s | s ⊆ pn for some natural number n},
where letting sw denote the number of stars in the Milky Way
in world w, pn = {w | sw ∈ [n− 10, n+ 10]}
(28) a. What is Alice’s phone number, or what is her email address?
b. Res((28-a)) = {s | s ⊆ px or s ⊆ qx for some x},
where px = {w | Alice’s phone number in w is x}
and qx = {w | Alice’s email address in w is x}
The only assumption needed for the inquisitive approach to work is that
a question determines some well-deﬁned resolution conditions.13,14
13 As we mentioned in Footnote 1, this needs to be refined somewhat by tak-
ing into account the role of the context. The crucial assumption of the inquisitive
approach will then be that, relative to a given context, a question determines some
well-defined resolution conditions.
14 In addition to this core assumption, here we are also working under the as-
sumption that information states  the objects at which the resolution conditions of
a question are assessed  are modeled as sets of possible worlds. This does limit the
scope of the theory somewhat, making it impossible, e.g., to distinguish between dif-
ferent questions that are resolved by tautological information. However, I do not view
this assumption as a part of the view I am advocating, but rather as pertaining to the
intensional semantics framework within which all of the theories that we are discussing
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Thus, the inquisitive approach combines the merits of the partition
theory of questions with those of answer-set theories: like the partition
theory, but unlike answer-set theories, it provides an elegant and ex-
planatory account of question entailment and coordination; at the same
time, like answer-set theories, but unlike the partition theory, it is not re-
stricted by the assumption that questions always have a unique complete
answer at a given world.
7. Discussion
In this section, I consider how traditional theories of questions may ad-
dress the problems identiﬁed above, and I discuss some possible concerns
with the inquisitive approach. I consider ﬁrst how question entailment
and conjunction may be analyzed in answer-set theories, and show that
this brings out some issues with the notion of basic semantic answers.
Second, I look at how one may try to relax the partition theory to analyze
non-partition questions, and show that this still falls short of a general
theory of questions. Third, I discuss what I view as a misconception on
inquisitive semantics, namely, the idea that inquisitive semantics is an
answer-set theory which allows for over-informative answers. Finally, I
point out some limitations of the inquisitive approach, which are parallel
to corresponding limitations of the truth-conditional view on statements.
7.1. Trying to repair answer-set theories
In Section 3, we have identiﬁed a problem for answer-set theories: these
theories cannot be combined with the general type-theoretic treatment
of entailment and conjunction to yield an analysis of question entailment
and question conjunction. It seems natural to ask, then, whether a diﬀer-
ent account of question entailment and coordination can be given based
on answer-set theories, and if so, how natural and general this account is.
Let us ﬁrst consider entailment. It is natural to think of question
entailment in terms of answerhood as follows: µ entails ν in case any
basic semantic answer to µ yields some corresponding basic semantic
are formulated. The view that the meaning of a question is to be identified with its
resolution conditions is compatible with other, more fine-grained representations of
information states. Substituting the underlying notion of information state would not
affect the features we discussed in this section: in particular, regardless of the way
in which information states are modeled, the resulting theory of questions will still
satisfy G&S desiderata, while not being restricted to unique-answer questions.
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answer to ν. We can thus consider the following relation ⊑ between
question meanings:
(29) BSA(µ) ⊑ BSA(ν) ⇐⇒ ∀a∈BSA(µ) ∃b∈BSA(ν) such that a ⊆ b
Does this indeed characterize the same relation of question entailment
that we have been concerned with in this paper? To answer the ques-
tion, one should specify how the resolution conditions of a question are
connected to its basic semantic answers. A natural assumption is the
following: a question is resolved in an information state s if and only if
at least one basic semantic answer to µ is established in s. In other words,
establishing a basic semantic answer is both necessary and suﬃcient to
resolve the question.15 Formally, this amounts to the following:
(30) p ∈ Res(µ) ⇐⇒ p ⊆ a for some a ∈ BSA(µ)
In the terminology of [Ciardelli, 2016b], this amounts to the assumption
that the set BSA(µ) be a generator for the set Res(µ). On the basis of
this assumption, one can indeed show that the relation ⊑ characterizes
question entailment:
(31) µ |= ν ⇐⇒ BSA(µ) ⊑ BSA(ν)
Thus, the answer-set approach, in combination with some natural as-
sumptions, does allow us to characterize the relation of entailment among
questions, even though unlike in the partition approach and in the in-
quisitive approach, an ad-hoc treatment of entailment is needed.
However, this characterization brings out a puzzling feature of the
answer-set approach, ﬁrst discussed by Roelofsen [2013]. Let us say that
two questions µ and ν are logically equivalent, notation µ ≡ ν, if they
entail each other. If two questions are logically equivalent, we would want
them to be assigned the same meaning: after all, if µ asks for at least as
much information as ν, and ν asks for at least as much information as ν,
then µ and ν ask for exactly the same information. This is indeed so in
the partition theory and in inquisitive semantics, but not on the answer-
set approach. Suppose, e.g., that µ and ν are interpreted as follows by
15 While this connection is very natural, it does not reflect the way that BSAs
are construed in all answer-set theories. While Bennett [1979] and Belnap [1982] seem
to take this view, Karttunen [1977] explicitly views BSAs as not sufficient, in general,
to resolve the question. This discrepancy makes it even clearer that some kind of
characterization of what is supposed to count as a BSA is needed in order to assess
the predictions of these theories.
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our theory: BSA(µ) = {a, b, c} and BSA(ν) = {a, b}, where c ⊂ b. Then
each BSA for µ is included in a BSA for ν and vice versa, so µ and ν are
logically equivalent. Yet, µ and ν are assigned diﬀerent meanings.
Is there a genuine diﬀerence between the meaning of µ and ν that
the answer-set approach allows us to track? If so, one should be able
to clearly characterize what this diﬀerence amounts to, in pre-theoretic
terms. Presumably, then, the logic should also be made sensitive to
whatever extra content is captured besides resolution conditions. How-
ever, a diﬀerent diagnosis seems more plausible to me: that the answer-
set approach draws spurious semantic distinctions; in the previous ex-
ample, for instance, the sets {a, b, c} and {a, b} should not be regarded
as two distinct meanings, but as two representations of one and the same
meaning. Inquisitive semantics provides a way to make this idea fully
precise: {a, b, c} and {a, b} generate exactly the same set of resolving
information states, and it is this set that can be taken to be the common
meaning expressed by our two equivalent questions µ and ν.
The mismatch we just pointed out is primarily a conceptual problem,
involving our understanding of the relations between logic and semantics,
and of the semantic representations delivered by the theory. However,
this problem also has empirical repercussions, as discussed in detail in
[Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2017]. Consider the following two questions:
(32) a. Does Alice live in Canada, in the US, or in California?
b. Does Alice live in Canada or in the US?
In a normal context, where it is presupposed that California is part of
the US, (32-a) is an odd question. In the inquisitive approach, this has a
simple explanation: (32-a) has the same meaning as (32-b), since the two
questions are resolved in exactly the same information states. Thus, a
speaker uttering (32-a) would be using a form that contains a redundant
constituent, one which does not make any contribution to the meaning
expressed. This sort of structural redundancy can be held responsible
for the infelicity of our sentence [Katzir and Singh, 2013; Meyer, 2014].
In standard answer-set approaches, however, (32-a) and (32-b) would be
associated with diﬀerent sets of basic semantic answers. Thus, the third
disjunct in (32-a) would make a non-trivial contribution to the meaning
of (32-a), and the explanation for the oddness of the question would
be lost.16
16 In some cases, questions where one disjunct entails another are in fact felicitous
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Let us now consider conjunction. We saw in Section 3 that, in answer-
set theories, conjunction cannot be analyzed in terms of intersection.
Rather, in such a theory it is natural to analyze a conjunctive question
µ∧ν as having as basic semantic answers propositions that are themselves
intersections of a BSA to µ with a BSA to ν:
(33) BSA(µ ∧ ν) = {p ∩ q | p ∈ BSA(ν) and q ∈ BSA(µ)}
This operation has indeed been considered in some logics based on the
answer-set approach [e.g., in Belnap and Steel, 1976]. From the point
of view of entailment, this clause deﬁnes a natural operation. Indeed,
one can see that, under the assumption that establishing a BSA is a
necessary and suﬃcient condition to resolve the question (i.e., under the
assumption that (30) holds), for any two questions µ and ν we have:
• µ ∧ ν |= µ
• µ ∧ ν |= ν
• if λ |= µ and λ |= ν, then λ |= µ ∧ ν
Thus, from the point of view of entailment, the operator ∧ behaves as a
greatest lower bound operator (meet), just as in classical logic.
However, as discussed in [Ciardelli et al., 2016], the disconnect be-
tween logical equivalence and semantic equivalence has repercussions for
conjunction as well.17 For instance, we would expect that conjoining a
question with itself is just a redundant operation, but this is not the case:
if BSA(µ) = {a, b}, where a and b are not included in each other, then
BSA(µ∧µ) = {a, b, a∩b} 6= BSA(µ). Thus, with respect to the semantics,
not only conjunction cannot be characterized as a meet operator, but it
is not even idempotent.
Conceptually, this issue is connected with the fact that logical equiv-
alence does not guarantee sameness of meaning. Indeed, the prediction
is that µ and µ∧µ are logically equivalent, yet they have diﬀerent mean-
(e.g., Did Alice drink coffee, tea, or both?). This is completely analogous to what
happens in the realm of disjunctive statements (compare the felicity of Alice drank
either coffee, or tea, or both.) An elegant explanation of the difference between the
felicitous disjunctions and the infelicitous ones has been given by Chierchia et al.
[2009]. Inquisitive semantics allows us to extend this explanation to questions [see
Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2017].
17 The crucial observation goes back to [Ciardelli, 2010], where it was mentioned
as a problem for an answer-set style implementation of inquisitive semantics. A prob-
lem analogous to the one discussed here arises for recent versions of truth-maker
semantics where truth-makers are taken to be exact, such as the system of Fine [2015].
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ings, with the latter having an extra basic semantic answer. However,
it is far from clear how we should understand this semantic distinction,
and how we should convince ourselves that a real diﬀerence exists.
As for the problem with entailment, this issue with conjunction also
has empirical repercussions: standardly, conjoining a sentence with itself
is a redundant operation, and this can be taken to explain why sentences
of the form ϕ ∧ ϕ are generally perceived as odd, no matter whether
they are statements or questions. However, the moment we accept that
conjunction is not idempotent, this explanation is lost.
My conclusion is that the problems with answer-set theories go be-
yond those pointed out by G&S. Not only do these theories not enable
us to analyze entailment and coordination by means of general notions
which are applicable outside the domain of questions. Even an ad-hoc
analysis of these notions, while possible, faces serious conceptual and
empirical issues. These issues call for an elucidation of the fundamental
notion on which these theories are built, the notion of basic semantic an-
swer, and for an explanation of how diﬀerences in basic semantic answers
are to be assessed.
7.2. Trying to repair the partition theory
Let us now consider how the partition theory may be amended to re-
move the restriction to partition questions. Suppose we want to preserve
the essence of the partition approach, namely, the idea that a question
expresses a binary relation on the logical space, but without relying on
the restrictive assumption that questions always have a unique complete
answer at each world. The natural way to go seems to be to characterize
the relation ∼µ expressed by a question µ as follows:
(34) w ∼µ w′ ⇐⇒ w and w′ share some complete answer to µ
Given this characterization, ∼µ is still symmetric, but not reﬂexive (since
the presupposition of µ may fail at w, in which case no complete answer
to µ is true at w) nor transitive (since some answer w and w′ may share
a complete answer, and w′ and w′′ may share some diﬀerent complete
answer, while w and w′′ do not share any complete answer). This is an
approach to the semantics of questions that has been pursued in early
versions of inquisitive semantics [Groenendijk, 2009; Mascarenhas, 2009].
By taking this approach, some generality is indeed gained. For in-
stance, conditional questions like (35), which are out of the scope of
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the partition theory [unless extended with a dynamic component, as in
Isaacs and Rawlins, 2008], can now be analyzed, as shown by Velissaratou
[2000].
(35) If Alice comes to the party, will Bob come as well?
However, this approach turns out to have problems that the partition
theory does not have: in particular, it does not allow us to properly
characterize the resolution conditions of questions. The only reasonable
candidate for a characterization of Res(µ) in terms of ∼µ seems to be
the following:
(36) s ∈ Res(µ) ⇐⇒ ∀w,w′ ∈ s : w ∼µ w′
But this simply does not deliver the correct predictions. To see why,
consider a mention-some question like (37).
(37) What is a color that Alice likes?
Suppose that w1, w2, w3 are possible worlds where the situation is as
follows:
• in w1 Alice likes only green and red;
• in w2 Alice likes only red and yellow;
• in w2 Alice likes only green and yellow.
Clearly, any pair of worlds from {w1, w2, w3} shares some answer to the
question (37). So, if s = {w1, w2, w3}, the condition ∀w,w′ ∈ s : w ∼µ w′
is satisﬁed. On the basis of (36) we would thus predict that our question
(37) is resolved in s. But this is not the case: given the information that
the actual world is one among w1, w2 and w3, it does not follow of any
speciﬁc color that Alice likes it, and so, (37) is unresolved in the state s.
In fact, the example can also be used to show that, regardless of
the recipe we use to derive resolution conditions from ∼µ, the approach
simply cannot deal in a satisfactory way with a mention-some ques-
tion like (37). For suppose that our whole space of possible worlds is
W = {w1, w2, w3}. Then, the meaning of the question (37) is the total
relation  the relation that holds between any two worlds in the set. This
is the same as the meaning of a tautological question, such as (38):
(38) Does 2 equal 2?
Thus, in this model, the approach would assign exactly the same mean-
ing to the tautological question (38) and to the non-tautological question
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(37), which requires non-trivial information to be resolved. This shows
that this relation-based approach is too restricted to deal with mention-
some questions like (37). And, in fact, the problem that we have just
pointed out can be reproduced with other kinds of non-partition ques-
tions, including approximate value questions and choice questions.18
In conclusion, while some extra generality is gained by moving from
partition relations to arbitrary symmetric relations, the resulting frame-
work is still quite restricted in scope. In particular, the three important
classes of questions that we have considered in Section 5 still remain
out of reach. Thus, this attempt to extend the partition theory to a
general theory of questions, while taking a step in the right direction, is
essentially unsuccessful.19
7.3. Resolution conditions and felicitous responses
Inquisitive semantics is sometimes erroneously characterized as a theory
which belongs to the answer-set class, but assumes that anything that
implies a basic semantic answer is itself a basic semantic answer. Coupled
18 The problem we just illustrated was first pointed out in [Ciardelli, 2008], where
it was also shown that the same problem arises if we replace binary relations with
relations of any fixed arity [for dicussion of the argument, see also Ciardelli and Roelof-
sen, 2011; Groenendijk, 2011; Ciardelli et al., 2015b; Ciardelli, 2016a]. Interestingly,
exactly the same formal problem was encountered in a very different area, related
to Carnap’s [1961] project to view properties as constructed out of a more primitive
similarity relation [see Leitgeb, 2007, for discussion].
19 Groenendijk and Stokhof [1989] propose a different way to generalize their the-
ory so as to deal with non-partition questions. They treat these questions as expressing
objects of a more complex type than those expressed by partition questions. To retain
a general account of question entailment and coordination, they provide a recipe for
lifting a basic question meaning (an equivalence relation) to a question meaning in the
higher type (a function from worlds to sets of sets of propositions). They then go on
to stipulate that this lifting is to be used to repair type mismatches which occur when
questions are compared or coordinated. Unfortunately, this proposal does not lead to
a proper treatment of entailment, since one can show that the resulting notion of en-
tailment is not even transitive. For instance, this approach correctly predicts that (i-a)
entails (i-b) and that (i-b) entails (i-c), but it fails to predict that (i-a) entails (i-c).
(i) a. What is Aliceès phone number?
b. What is the first digit of Aliceès phone number?
c. What is the first digit of Aliceès phone number, or what is the second digit?
Thus, this proposal forfeits one of the most attractive features of partition semantics,
namely, the elegant and uniform analysis of question entailment and coordination.
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with the further assumption that statements expressing basic semantic
answers should be felicitous in response to a question, this misunder-
standing gives rise to claims that the inquisitive approach predicts the
following to be a felicitous exchange.
(39) a. What is Alice’s phone number?
b. Alice loves risotto, and her phone number is 06389203.
This paper provides an opportunity to set this misunderstanding
straight. Inquisitive semantics does not make any assumption about
basic semantic answers; rather, it departs from the answer-set paradigm
altogether, taking a diﬀerent perspective, more similar to the standard
truth-conditional approach to statements. As we saw, in inquisitive se-
mantics a question is not interpreted indirectly, via its answers, but
directly, by laying out what information needs to be available in order
for the question to be resolved.
It is clear that, if the information described by the statement (39-b) is
available in an information state, then the question in (39-a) is resolved in
that information state, as well as in any information state that contains
even more information. By itself, this does not yield any predictions
about what counts as a felicitous response once (39-a) is asked in a
conversation; for a statement to constitute a felicitous response to a
question, being issue-resolving is neither a suﬃcient condition, nor a
necessary one.
One might be tempted to think that, by laying out a set of semantic
answers, the answer-set approach does provide a characterization of the
felicitous responses to a given question. If so, this may be viewed as
an advantage of this approach. But this is not the case: the felicity
of a response depends on whether it is relevant to the question in the
discourse, and this is simply not something that we can tell on the basis
of semantics alone. For instance, in an ordinary context, (41-a,b) are fe-
licitous replies to (40), while (41-c,d) are not; yet no account of questions
dreams of pre-encoding this diﬀerence into the semantics of the question
in (40).
(40) Is Alice home?
(41) a. Yes, she’s preparing her class.
b. Yes, I just talked to her on the phone.
c. ??Yes, her brother is a chemist.
d. ??Yes, I’ve known her for years.
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The upshot of this discussion is that on either the answer-set approach
or the inquisitive approach, we cannot expect the contrast between felic-
itous and infelicitous responses to be directly captured by the semantics.
And, in my view, we shouldn’t, just like we do not expect to read oﬀ the
truth-conditions of the statement (42) that (43-a), but not (43-b), is a
felicitous response to (42) in a standard scenario.
(42) The bus was late again.
(43) a. You should get yourself a bike.
b. ??You should get yourself a dog.
7.4. Anaphora and discourse referents
For statements, the view of meaning as truth-conditions has proven ex-
tremely useful in many domains. Yet, there are also phenomena that
call for a richer level of semantic representation. The most important
case, in my view, is provided by anaphora. For instance, the following
two sentences have the same truth-conditions.
(44) a. Some students are not here.
b. Not all students are here.
However, the two diﬀer in their potential to license certain anaphoric
expressions. The discourse in (45-a) is perfectly coherent, unlike the one
in (45-b).
(45) a. Some students are not here. They are sick.
b. Not all students are here. ??They are sick.
Even though this is not a fatal argument against a purely truth-con-
ditional view on meaning [see Stalnaker, 1998], the most perspicuous
explanation of these data assumes a semantic diﬀerence between (44-a)
and (44-b): the former sentence, unlike the latter, creates a discourse
referent, which can later be referred to by means of the pronoun they.
This is formalized in various versions of dynamic semantics, where the
meaning of a sentence is identiﬁed not with its truth-conditions, but with
its potential to bring about a change in a certain information structure
[Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991]
With questions, we ﬁnd a similar situation. Consider the following
sentences, modeled after examples in [Roelofsen and Farkas, 2015].
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(46) a. Are you married?
b. Are you unmarried?
Under any of the theories that we discussed so far, these questions are
regarded as semantically equivalent. In particular, they are equivalent
in inquisitive semantics, since both are resolved if and only if it is es-
tablished that the addressee is married, or it is established that the ad-
dressee is not married. However, notice that an answer yes (or no) means
something diﬀerent in response to (46-a) than in response to (46-b).
(47) a. Is Alice married? Yes. ; Alice is married.
b. Is Alice unmarried? Yes. ; Alice is unmarried.
While a pragmatic explanation of this fact is in principle possible, a
semantic account of the contrast requires a more ﬁne-grained represen-
tation of the semantics of the given questions than provided by resolution
conditions (or by any of the theories that we discussed above). If we see
resolution conditions as analogous to truth-conditions, this should not
strike us as surprising: after all, what the particle yes is doing is to refer
anaphorically to a certain proposition. Just like truth-conditions, then,
resolution-conditions do not capture what discourse referents a sentence
makes available for anaphoric reference.
A class of theories of questions that we have not discussed so far, the
so-called categorial theories [Tichy, 1978; Hausser and Zaeﬀerer, 1978;
Scha, 1983], put the interpretation of answers in the context of questions
at the center of attention, and provide an analysis of questions that im-
mediately account for the contrast between (47-a) and (47-b). However,
these theories have troubles in other respects. In particular, the analysis
of question entailment and coordination is problematic on this view,
since there is no uniform semantic type for questions. Moreover, these
theories make it diﬃcult to account for the contribution of questions
embedded under verbs such as know, unless they are supplemented with
some type-shifting device that retrieves, e.g., a partition-theory meaning
for the question. This situation was already clear to Groenendijk and
Stokhof [1984], who combined their partition theory with a categorial-
style treatment of term answers.20 Aloni and van Rooij [2002] made
the idea more systematic, implementing it in the framework of dynamic
20 A term answer is an answer consisting of a constituent rather than a full
statement, like the answer thirty-two to the question how old are you?.
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semantics. It seems reasonable to expect that a similar approach can be
developed replacing partition semantics with inquisitive semantics.
This does not mean that we should not, after all, analyze the meaning
of a question in terms of resolution conditions. Just like truth-conditions,
I believe that resolution conditions provide a level of semantic represen-
tation which is as ﬁne-grained as needed to discern certain important
notions, such as entailment, and to analyze many linguistic and cogni-
tive phenomena. At the same time, the observations above indicate that
to analyze other phenomena, in particular involving anaphora, a more
ﬁne-grained approach is needed.21
8. Conclusion
Inquisitive semantics provides an approach to questions that closely re-
sembles the truth-conditional approach to statements. Questions are not
analyzed indirectly, by reducing them to answers, but directly, in terms
of a relation of satisfaction relative to certain states. The only diﬀerence
with statements is that the relevant states are not states of aﬀairs, but
states of information, and that satisfaction does not amount to rendering
the sentence true, but rather to rendering it resolved.22
The fundamental notions of question entailment and coordination are
accounted for straightforwardly by applying the general type-theoretic
treatment of entailment and coordination to questions. Thus, the ap-
proach has the explanatory value that Groenendijk and Stokhof [1984]
demanded of a theory of questions  something which answer-set theories
lack. Remarkably, this result is not achieved through some clever artiﬁce;
rather, given the inquisitive perspective, the technical characterization
of the relevant notions directly corresponds to our pre-theoretical under-
standing of these notions. For instance, the technical fact that question
conjunction is captured by intersection amounts to the intuitive fact
that to resolve a conjunctive question is to resolve both conjuncts. Simi-
larly, the technical fact that question entailment is captured by inclusion
21 For instance, see [Roelofsen and Farkas, 2015] for an account of the contrast
shown in (47) formulated within a refinement of inquisitive semantics.
22 In fact, as mentioned in Footnote 7, in inquisitive semantics statements are
interpreted relative to information states as well, and truth-conditions are obtained
as a derived notion. This makes the analysis of statements and questions even more
uniform than I am suggesting here.
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amounts to the intuitive fact that for a question to be stronger than
another is to be more inquisitive, i.e., to ask for more information.
The fact that this approach allows us to get a ﬁrm grip on question
entailment and coordination is clearly of great importance from the per-
spective of logic. And indeed, the development of inquisitive semantics
has lead to the construction and investigation of a range of logics in which
statements and questions interact [see Ciardelli, 2016a, for an overview].
In addition, unlike the partition theory, the approach is not restricted
by any speciﬁc assumptions about questions, except for the assumption
that a question (possibly in combination with a context) should deter-
mine certain well-deﬁned resolution conditions. In particular, unlike
partition semantics, the approach is applicable to questions which can-
not be resolved in some worlds  because of a presupposition failure 
as well as questions which can be resolved in multiple consistent ways 
including important classes like mention-some questions, approximate
value questions, and choice questions. This makes inquisitive semantics
suitable as a foundation for a fully general theory of questions.
Overall, I hope to have convinced the reader that resolution condi-
tions can and should play for questions the same fundamental role that
truth-conditions have traditionally played in the analysis of statements.
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